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KEEPING PEACE IN THE FAMILY WHILE YOU ARE
RESTING IN PEACE: MAKING SENSE OF AND
PREVENTING WILL CONTESTS
Judith G. McMullen*

INTRODUCTION
Family members often fight over the estates of their departed
loved ones. It is a safe guess, however, that many of these
decedents had confidently assumed that their own families
would not fight, even though newspapers and literature are
replete with examples of warring heirs. Sometimes people
believe that estate disputes occur only when huge fortunes are at
stake, such as in the infamous dispute between the former
topless dancer Anna Nicole Smith, and the children of her late
husband, oil tycoon J. Howard Marshall II.1 A recent survey of
affluent Americans revealed that eighteen percent of them worry
that their heirs will fight over their estates.2 It is clear, though,
that disputes frequently occur in smaller estates as well. In a
column lampooning the dispute over the estate of George Halas
(owner of the Chicago Bears franchise, among other things), the
late Mike Royko had his alter ego Slats Grobnik declare:
[Fighting about money] happens with little fortunes,
too. You go over to Probate Court and what do you
see? Some old guy leaves a three‐flat and you got his

Judith McMullen is a Professor of Law at Marquette University. She
received her B.A. from the University of Notre Dame and her J.D. from
Yale Law School.
*

1. Bruce Nichols, Battle of Wills: Widowed Ex‐Playmate, Tycoon’s Sons Head for
Court in Inheritance Feud, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23, 2000, at A39.
2. Jennifer Harper, Splitting Heirs Over Wealth: But Children Usually Inherit Most
of It, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at A1.
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six kids in there, all fighting over who gets the top
floor, who gets the basement and the wash machine,
and how do they split up the garage and the tool shed?
You got brothers and sisters filing motions for custody
of a bowling ball or asking for an accounting of every
lure in the old man’s tackle box.3
There are, of course, countless ways to fight about money.
This article focuses on post‐mortem challenges to wills. In some
cases, disappointed heirs4 may be willing to allow probate of the
will but may challenge a particular provision. This article
discusses one such situation where a disappointed heir claims
that a particular will provision is void, as it is against public
policy.5 The article also discusses another type of post‐mortem
challenge where a disappointed heir contests a will’s admission
to probate and subsequent operation. In such a case, the will is
challenged on grounds of the testator’s lack of mental capacity,
failure to observe the necessary formalities of execution, or
subjection to undue influence by a person who thereby unfairly
benefits.
The aforementioned types of will challenges have this in
common: they all involve a clash between the testator’s stated
intentions and the disappointed heirs’ expectations and desires.
It is important to understand at the outset that, while the legal
issues may differ somewhat in individual cases, the claims are

3. Mike Royko, Go for Broke – It’s the Only Way to Die, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1987,
§ 1, at 3.
4. Throughout the article, the term “presumptive heirs” is used to denote
persons who would inherit under the intestate laws of the state, and “beneficiaries”
to denote individuals who have in fact been given property under a will. The term
“disappointed heirs” refers to persons who are presumptive heirs but have had
their inheritances reduced or eliminated by a will.
5. Other examples of challenges to particular will provisions are outside the
scope of this article. For example, situations where a testator attempts to disinherit
a non‐consenting spouse are typically addressed by various state statutes (such as
community property rules, elective share statutes, homestead statutes, and statutes
allowing spousal allowances during estate administration). None of these statutes
are directly relevant to the discussion here. Similarly, this article will not discuss
the unintentional omission of children (which is normally covered by pretermitted
heir statutes) or cases governing interpretation of ambiguous will terminology
(which is usually dealt with by having the court examine extrinsic evidence to
clarify what the testator meant).
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almost invariably the result of a disappointed heir feeling that
she has been treated unfairly or has not received what she
expected to receive. Hence, clients and their lawyers must ask
some difficult questions about fairness to, and expectations of,
presumptive heirs.6 Rather than focusing on the technical issues
of will drafting or execution, this article reflects on the emotional
causes of fighting over an estate, and suggests some ways to
reduce the family fighting and hard feelings that result in will
contests.
The first section below describes some of the common legal
challenges used to prevent the enforcement of specific will
provisions or to contest the will’s admission to probate. The
article then discusses the overarching issue of why surviving
family members fight about property after the death of a loved
one. Here, the article describes the legal concept of freedom of
testation, and contrasts a testator’s view towards property
ownership and disposal with the views of potential family
recipients. This section also discusses the implicit preference
that the law gives to presumptive heirs – a preference that
probably bolsters the resolve of disappointed heirs to engage in
will challenges. In the final section, the article describes specific
steps that typically are recommended for use by testators to
reduce the likelihood of will challenges, and it concludes by
asking clients and their lawyers to mull over the long‐term
emotional and social repercussions of proposed estate plans.
CHALLENGES TO WILLS
The typical family dispute occurs when a presumptive heir
discovers that he is not getting something he expected, felt
entitled to, or was promised. This might mean, for example, that
the heir does not receive an equal share under the will or trust,
or does not receive some particular piece of property that was
6. Of course, it is not only disappointed heirs who challenge estate plans;
disappointed friends or disgruntled employees might attempt a challenge as well.
For the sake of simplicity, I am focusing on intrafamily disputes, although many of
the principles could apply also to challenges mounted by non‐relatives.
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promised. The disappointed heir will consult a lawyer, who will
devise a challenge based on the type of instrument involved and
the legal requirements surrounding it. If a will is the source of
the proposed estate distribution, this challenge will take the
form of either a challenge to specific will provisions or a
challenge to the will’s initial admission to probate.
CHALLENGES TO PARTICULAR WILL PROVISIONS ON GROUNDS OF
PUBLIC POLICY
Sometimes a disappointed heir concedes that a will is a
valid expression of the testator’s intent but challenges a
particular will provision. Freedom of testation allows a testator
to freely dispose of property in any way that is not contrary to
public policy,7 so the usual argument against a provision is that
it should be treated as void for reasons of public policy. Classic
examples of successful challenges on public policy grounds
include cases where a court negates will provisions that are
wasteful or destructive in a way that harms surviving persons.
For example, courts may overturn provisions that require an
executor to raze the testator’s house.8 Similarly, at least one
court has refused to enforce a will provision that required the
testator to be buried with her valuable jewelry.9 Still, provisions
that are destructive in pursuit of a valid purpose may be
upheld.10
7. See infra notes 128‐142 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (concluding that will provision that instructed executor to raze testator’s
home, sell lot, and add proceeds to residue of estate went against public policy
because damage to neighbors and diminished value of residuary estate were not
counterbalanced by any benefits).
9. In re Estate of Meksras, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 372 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1974)
(holding that burying jewelry or other valuables would lead to grave‐robbing and
other violation of cemeteries, in contravention of public interest).
10. See, e.g., In re Estate of Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. Misc. 1998) The will
provision directed the executor to demolish testator’s house at the estate’s expense
and offer the property to the city, which had an option to purchase it. Id. at 839.
The testator was a ninety‐seven‐year‐old woman with no apparent heirs. Id. She
previously agreed to give the city an option to purchase her home for $100 after her
death in exchange for the city dropping a condemnation action against the
property. Id. at 840.
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Courts are indulgent of testamentary provisions that put
conditions on bequests. An example of such a provision is a
bequest that is to be paid upon a beneficiary’s marriage or
graduation from college.11 Because these conditions usually are
meant to influence behavior, they often are resented by
presumptive heirs and may be challenged. However, courts
tend to treat the conditional bequests as choices available to a
beneficiary, rather than as restrictions of fundamental rights and
therefore violations of public policy. For example, in Succession
of Augustus,12 the testator bequeathed a life interest in her
separate property to her husband on the condition that he never
allowed his former wife to enter the house.13 The husband
remarried his ex‐wife after the testator’s death and challenged
the provision as violating public policy because it restrained his
ability to marry.14 The court upheld the provision, finding that it
did not restrict the husband’s right to remarry.15 Similarly, in
Meade v. Pongonis,16 the testator’s will provided that her son
would take his residuary share only if he was divorced or
widowed from his wife.17 The court upheld the provision,
noting that divorce is considered in the public interest in many
circumstances.18
In Shapira v. Union National Bank,19 the testator gave gifts to
his two sons on the condition that, within seven years of his
death, they each marry a Jewish woman whose parents were
both Jewish.20 One son challenged the provision as violating his
constitutional right to marry and therefore void as against public

11. See, e.g. Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Misc. 1974).
12. 361 So. 2d 474 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
13. Id. at 475.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 476 (also stating that second marriages were not entitled to same
protections under Louisiana law).
16. No. CV89 0263416 S., 1993 WL 171367 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 19, 1993).
17. Id. at *1 (citing Dadoll v. Moon, 91 A. 646 (Conn. 1914)).
18. Id. at *1‐2.
19. 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Misc. 1974).
20. Id. at 826.
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policy.21 The court refused to find that the restriction violated
public policy and held that it was only a partial restraint on
marriage.22 In addition, the court noted that the testator’s
condition deserved to be upheld, coming as it did from deep
convictions about his Jewish heritage.23
These examples illustrate several things about cases
challenging specific will provisions. First, challenges of this type
presuppose that the will has been admitted to probate, which
means that appropriate proof has been offered that the
document is a valid expression of the testator’s desires regarding
disposition of property. Second, once the will has been proved,
there is a strong presumption in favor of honoring the testator’s
instructions.
Finally, before courts will overturn specific
provisions, they insist upon a showing of demonstrable and
irremediable harm that is not counterbalanced by a
demonstrable benefit to known individuals or some segment of
society. In other words, it is very difficult to prevail in a
challenge to a will provision as contrary to public policy.
Disappointed heirs have another option open to them, however:
they can challenge the will’s initial admission to probate.
WILL CONTESTS
A will contest is a legal challenge to the will’s validity,
which, if successful, will prevent that will’s admission to
probate.24 If the will is denied probate, the estate is distributed
either according to the rules of intestate succession or, in some
cases, according to the terms of an earlier will.25 Obviously, the
disappointed heir has a motivation to begin a will contest only if
the alternative distribution will give him a larger share of the
21. Id. at 827.
22. Id. at 828–832. The court based its decision, in part, on an estimate of the
number of Jewish residents in the area, which the court believed demonstrated that
the son had plenty of opportunities to find a suitable Jewish girl to marry. Id.
23. Id. at 832.
24. See generally ROGER W. ANDERSON & IRA M. BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 15‐16 (4th ed. 2005).
25. See generally id. at 39‐40.
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estate.
Three main ways to attack the will’s admission to probate
are: (1) a showing that the will was not executed with the
required formalities; (2) a showing that the testator lacked the
requisite mental capacity at the time the will was executed; or (3)
a showing that the will was obtained through undue influence.26
In each case, the opponent of the will is seeking to show that the
will’s execution or the testator’s state of mind was defective so
that, as a matter of law, the will cannot be accepted as a reliable
expression of the testator’s intentions.27
WILL FORMALITIES
State statutes prescribe the formalities necessary for a valid
will. Generally, the will must be in writing, signed by the
testator, and witnessed by two or more disinterested persons
who may or may not be required to be present at the actual
signing.28 Will contests based on alleged execution defects,
historically, were more commonplace than they are today; this is
probably because many courts insisted on literal compliance
with statutory will formalities even where this clearly frustrated
the testator’s intent.29
Cases revolved around esoteric
discussions about definitional issues such as what constitutes
“presence” at the will’s execution. Bruce Mann, a scholar of law
and history, described the courts’ behavior thusly:
Was one of the attesting witnesses called from the room
while the testator was in mid‐signature? If so, the will
is invalid because it was not signed in the presence of
both witnesses. Did the witnesses sign separately, the
26. See generally LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 4‐39 to 4‐81 (4th
ed. 2006).
27. Id. at 4‐39.
28. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 853.03 (2004). See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2‐502
(revised 1990); MICH, COMP. LAWS § 700.2902 (2002). Compare VT. STAT. ANN. TIT.
14, § 5 (requiring three witnesses); OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.03 (1953)(allowing oral
wills).
29. See generally Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate
Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035‐36 (1994).
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first one passing the second on the way out of the
room? If so, the will is invalid because the witnesses
did not sign in each other’s presence. Did the attorney
omit the attestation clause, although the witnesses
signed a self‐proving affidavit that they thought was an
attestation clause, that looked like an attestation clause,
and that was where the attestation clause would have
been? If so, the will is invalid because not attested.
Courts have routinely invalidated wills for minor
defects in form even in uncontested cases and
sometimes even while conceding – always ruefully, of
course – that the document clearly represents the
wishes and intent of the testator.30
In the last part of the twentieth century, probate legislation
began to shift in the direction of “dispensing power,” a doctrine
that had been analyzed and championed by legal scholar John
Langbein, among others.31 Basically, the dispensing power
“allows the proponent of a purported will to prove what courts
now infer from compliance with the formalities – that the
decedent intended the document to be a will.”32 Formalities still
may be important indicators of a testator’s intent, but minor
defects no longer automatically invalidate a will.33 Incorporation
of the dispensing power into the 1990 Uniform Probate Code
Section 2‐503 represented a huge shift in thinking about what
constitutes a valid will.34
Disappointed heirs still may bring claims that a will is
invalid because it was improperly executed, but the
philosophical shift in the way formalities are viewed makes
success more difficult.35 In re Estate of Shamoon36 provides an
30. Id. at 1036 (citing In re Colling, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1440 (Eng. Ch.); In re
Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733 (Eng. P.); Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
1983)).
31. See Mann, supra note 29, at 1040.
32. Id. at 1040‐41.
33. Id. at 1040.
34. Id. at 1035 (describing this as “the most significant change in what
constitutes a will since enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1677”).
35. However, not all states follow the more forgiving approach of § 2‐503. See,
e.g., Smith v. Wharton, 78 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Ark. 2002). The testatrix, who had a
broken arm, signed her will with an “X” in front of three attesting witnesses. Id. at
81. Because one witness typed the testator’s name next to the mark outside of the
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illustration. In Shamoon, a widow’s son filed a will contest
claiming that his mother’s will was not properly signed and
witnessed under Texas law.37 The will was not self‐proved;38
hence, admission of the will to probate required testimony by
the attesting witnesses. Both witnesses had forgotten certain
details, but both testified about their usual practices in
witnessing wills, such as the fact that they would not have
signed if the testator had not signed first or appeared to be
under duress or lacking in capacity.39 The appeals court
concluded that the evidence presented was both sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict that the will was properly executed
and sufficient as a matter of law.40 The court noted that the
relevant section of the probate code “requires certain facts to be
proved to the satisfaction of the court, showing, among other
things not germaine [sic] to this appeal, that the testatrix
executed the will with the formality and solemnity required by
the law to make it a valid will.”41 In other words, even though
certain details of execution were not documented in the record,
the court was entitled to find that the formalities had been
fulfilled.
Despite the trend in modern probate law that allows courts
to look at will formalities in a more functional way, will contests
continue to include claims of improper execution, often in
conjunction with claims that the testator lacked testamentary
capacity or was unduly influenced.42

other witnesses’ presence, the court held that the will did not comply with statutory
requirements for execution by mark. Id. at 87.
36. No. 13‐03‐312‐CV, 2005 WL 1831705 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2005).
37. Id. at *1.
38. A self‐proved will is accompanied by an affidavit, signed by the witnesses,
attesting that the statutory formalities were satisfied. See ANDERSON & BLOOM
supra note 24, at 102‐103.
39. In re Estate of Shamoon, No. 13‐03‐312‐CV, 2005 WL 1831705, at *4‐5 (Tex.
Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2005).
40. Id. at *5.
41. Id. at *2.
42. See, e.g., Hensley v. Harris, 870 So. 2d 1227, 1229‐30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

MCMULLEN MQE (2)

70

2/28/2007 6:48:25 PM

MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR

[Vol. 8

LACK OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND UNDUE INFLUENCE
In addition to fulfilling whatever formalities are required by
the relevant state statute, a testator must possess the requisite
testamentary capacity for the will to be valid.43 The testator
must be of sound mind and memory at the time the will is
executed and may not be under the “undue influence” of any
person. If a person is lacking in capacity due to illness (such as
Alzheimer’s disease or AIDS‐related dementia), then any wills
created after the onset of the illness are deemed invalid because
they do not represent the voluntary, knowing expression of the
testator’s desires.44 Will provisions that are the product of an
insane delusion also are invalid.45 In cases where the lack of
testamentary capacity is proved, the court essentially finds that
the testator (meaning the intact, competent testator) did not
make the testamentary statement; it was instead the illness
speaking.46 Thus, a showing of testator incompetence results in
the denial of the will’s probate.
In re Estate of Washburn 47 provides one example of a
successful will contest based on lack of capacity. There, the aunt
had executed a series of three wills.48 The first will gave $1000
bequests to several named individuals, the bulk of the estate to
her sister, and a default gift to her niece, Catherine.49 The second
will (executed after the death of her sister) gave $1000 bequests
to several individuals, $5000 to her caretaker, and the rest of the
estate to Catherine.50 The third will, executed three weeks later,
left $5000 bequests to Catherine and another individual, the rest
of the estate to her caretaker.51 Catherine challenged the
admission of the third will to probate, alleging that her aunt had
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4‐39.
See generally id. at 4‐51 to 4‐54.
Id. at 4‐45 to 4‐55.
See generally id. at 4‐51 to 4‐54.
690 A.2d 1024 (N.H. 1997).
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Alzheimer’s disease at the time of its execution and was
therefore lacking in testamentary capacity.52 Based on medical
and other testimony presented by Catherine, the probate court
concluded that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the
time she executed the third will because the testator was
confused and forgetful both as to her property and as to her
family members, who were the natural objects of her bounty.53
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed.54
Undue influence is another form of will challenge that may
be brought.55 Usually a disappointed heir alleges undue
influence when another beneficiary receives a disproportionate
share of the estate. While various technical legal tests for undue
influence exist, the claim amounts to a charge that the
beneficiary who has been awarded a larger‐than‐expected share
(that is, a larger share than was expected by the challenger)
procured that share by pressuring the testator so that the testator
was carrying out the beneficiary’s desires rather than the
testator’s own intentions.56 The difficulty, from a court’s
perspective, is distinguishing between cases in which a
beneficiary engaged in deceit or duress and cases in which the
beneficiary received a reward intended by the testator, even
though the disappointed heirs believe the gift could be due only
to the named beneficiary’s manipulative behavior. A few cases
illustrate this quandary.
In Hensley v. Harris,57 a testator left most of his estate to his
son Ricky, with a residual gift to one of his grandsons, David.58
After the testator’s death, his other children, who were
disinherited, challenged the will, claiming inter alia that their
father had been subjected to undue influence by Ricky.59 The

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1026‐27.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4‐59 to 4‐76.
Id.
870 So. 2d 1227 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1230.
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appeals court affirmed a holding in Ricky’s favor, noting that
testimony by the will’s scrivener showed that the testator
disinherited his other children because he was upset with them
for having put their mother in a nursing home prior to her
death.60 The court noted that although Ricky had begun to
spend more time with his father around the time of the will’s
execution, there was no evidence that Ricky had been present at
meetings to prepare the will or had anything to do with the
preparation of the will.61 The testator used his estate to reward
one son for attentive behavior and to punish his other children
for their decision to place their mother in a nursing home rather
than caring for her themselves.62 However, the disinherited
children were convinced that their brother had engaged in fraud
or manipulation of their father.
In re Estate of Glogovsek63 provides another example of a will
contest in the face of disappointed expectations. The testator
had no children of his own but had been married for thirty‐four
years to a woman with two children.64 The testator originally
had instructed his attorney to draft a will leaving his estate to his
wife, with his three nieces as contingent beneficiaries.65 He
never executed that will, however, and his wife later instructed
the attorney to make changes both to her own draft and to her
husband’s.66 After the changes, the will gave the testator’s estate
to his wife, but if she predeceased him, then to her two children
(the testator’s stepchildren).67 The lawyer made the changes as
directed, delivered the wills personally, and allowed the testator
and his wife to read and discuss the wills privately.68 Before
allowing the testator to execute the will, the lawyer asked
whether the testator read it and understood it, and whether it
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 1230–31.
See id.
618 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was correct.69 The testator responded affirmatively to all three
questions.70
Later, the testator’s brother, sister, and three nieces
challenged the will’s admission to probate, claiming that the
wife exerted undue influence on the testator.71 Persuaded by the
fact that the wife managed the couple’s financial affairs and had
orchestrated the will’s drafting, the lower court found that the
nieces had raised a presumption of undue influence that the
stepchildren did not rebut.72 In reversing the lower court, the
appellate court noted that spouses in a close marital relationship
naturally exert influence upon each other, and this influence is
not improper or undue.73 The court further held that the lower
court improperly found that the testator’s blood relations had a
better claim to the testator’s property.74 Testimony showed that
the testator’s stepdaughter was only thirteen at the time of
testator’s marriage to her mother, and for all intents and
purposes, she had been the testator’s daughter for thirty‐four
years.75 Both she and her brother, who was older and had never
lived with testator, were close to their mother and to the testator,
visiting frequently and on holidays and special occasions.76
Testimony from the testator’s blood relatives revealed that while
their relations were cordial, their contacts had been limited to
holidays and special occasions.77 Each of the nieces had
inherited, through joint tenancy, property worth about $2,300.78
Although the disappointed heirs viewed the estate plan as the
result of manipulation by the testator’s wife, the appellate court
viewed it as a rational recognition that the wife and stepchildren
had been the testator’s closest family for the past thirty‐four
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1237‐39.
Id. at 1239‐40.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1234‐35.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1235.
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years.79
Other cases show similar patterns. In re Estate of Henke80
featured a testator who changed her will the day after her son
committed suicide to exclude his children, who previously
would have inherited the entire estate.81 Instead, she left the
property to her daughter, who had driven the testator to the
lawyer’s office in order to change the will.82 In upholding the
lower court’s conclusion that any presumption of undue
influence had been rebutted, the appellate court cited testimony
from the testator’s lawyer, who also was her neighbor.83 He
reported that testator had been unhappy with her grandchildren
because they did not help their father enough with the farm.84
He quoted the testator as having said, “They didn’t come to see
me when I was alive so I don’t want them seeing me laying in
the coffin.”85 Similarly, the court admitted the will to probate in
In re Estate of Loomis,86 a case where the testator “gave cash
bequests totaling $26,500 to nine of her nieces and nephews,”
then left the bulk of her one million dollar estate to two
charitable trusts.87 Some of the nieces and nephews challenged
the will, arguing that their aunt had been unduly influenced by
her lawyer, who was named as a co‐trustee of the trusts.88 The
challengers argued that their aunt was diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease four years after the execution of the will and
was therefore susceptible to the lawyer’s undue influence in the
preparation of the will. The lower court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the will’s proponents was affirmed by the
appellate court, which noted that there was neither evidence that
the testator was under any incapacity when the will was
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1240‐41.
561 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316‐317.
Id.
Id. at 319.
Id.
810 P.2d 126 (Wyo. 1991).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 127.
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executed nor any evidence that the lawyer engaged in any
activity that unduly influenced the testator in her will’s drafting
or execution.89 The aunt’s apparently spontaneous charitable
impulses were viewed by her disappointed relatives as the
product of manipulative and self‐serving behavior by her
lawyer.90
In these cases and countless others like them, there is a
discrepancy between what the testator intended and how the
disappointed heirs interpreted the testator’s intentions. In some
cases, such as Hensley or Glogovsek, the testator may have
intended only to reward a family member who was particularly
close or solicitous during the testator’s lifetime. In other cases,
like Henke, the testator may have been punishing the
disappointed heirs for things done or not done. Still in other
cases, such as Loomis, the testator may have thought she was
leaving appropriate bequests for the heirs, while leaving the rest
of the estate to a more deserving entity. However, to the
disappointed heirs, it seemed that the person who received
unexpected benefits under the will “took over” or isolated the
testator from the affections of the rest of the family, resulting in
an unjust disposition of the testator’s estate.
Why do the testators, the beneficiaries and the disappointed
heirs have such different views of the ultimate will distribution?
Perhaps the competing views result from different perspectives
not only about their family relationships but also about property
ownership within the family.
DISPUTES OVER ESTATE DISTRIBUTION: WHY DO FAMILIES
FIGHT?
At this point, we must ask two questions: (1) why would a
testator disinherit or otherwise disappoint the presumptive heir;
89. Id. at 129‐30.
90. See id. at 128. The lawyer’s actions were portrayed as self‐serving by the
disappointed heirs who claimed that the future trustee fees that would be paid to
the lawyer and his partner were a benefit that the lawyer had manipulated for
himself from the testator. See id.
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and (2) why might a presumptive heir form feelings of
entitlement so intense that he believes he is justified in
challenging his ancestor’s will?
One way to analyze these questions is to consider the
attitudes that current property holders and their presumptive
heirs have about property. There are many reasons a testator
might reduce a presumptive heir’s share or even disinherit a
presumptive heir altogether. The larger question is why
testators feel free to do so, rather than feeling obligated to their
presumptive heirs. To put it another way, why do living
property owners feel entitled to control their property after their
deaths? Similarly, why do presumptive heirs feel entitled to
receive anything at all from their ancestors? Why do they expect
post‐mortem gifts in addition to whatever lifetime support their
older relatives have already provided to them?
FREEDOM OF TESTATION AND LIVING PROPERTY OWNERS
Much has been written about the relationship between
owners and their property in Anglo‐American law and society.
There is a strong legal and cultural tradition of freedom of
property disposition in American law.91
Freedom of disposition, or donative freedom,
encompasses several distinct yet related ideas – the
right to give your property away during life and to
pass it on at death, the right to choose who gets it, the
right to choose the form in which they get it, and the
right to give another person the right to make those
choices even after your death.92
Various justifications have been offered for allowing broad
powers over property to extend beyond the death of the owner.
Some have argued that freedom of testation provides an
incentive to acquire and save property, and that it encourages
beneficiaries to provide the necessary social services, such as

91. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 26, at 1‐6.
92. Id.
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care during the old age or illness of family members.93 Of
course, people accumulate property for many reasons. “Persons
accumulate [property] to gratify their egos, to gain prestige, to
gain power – and simply out of habit.”94
A property owner’s attitude toward the ownership and
control of her property is often complicated. Property may
represent self‐image, status, or a sense of control over one’s own
life or over the behavior of others.95 According to sociologist
Juliet Schor, this is particularly true in a materialistic society like
the United States:
What [many Americans] acquire and own is tightly
bound to their personal identity. Driving a certain type
of car, wearing particular designer labels, living in a
certain kind of home, and ordering the right bottle of
wine create and support a particular image of
themselves to present to the world.96
Ownership of any kind of property may symbolize success
and power to the owner. Car ownership is but one example of
the psychological dynamic of property ownership. People often
buy a particular car because of its image.97 Acquiring a driver’s
license is viewed as a gateway to maturity and independence,
and surrendering a driver’s license in old age is seen as a
surrender of autonomy.98
Property may have increasing importance as people age.
[F]or older people with physical or mental frailty,
property is often virtually identical to liberty because
assets are essential for liberty. Once isolated by a
physical or mental disability, only the elder’s assets can
provide an avenue of access to human companionship
and services, and a personal sphere of importance that
93. Adam J. Hirsch & William K. S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand,
68 IND. L.J. 1, 8‐11 (1992).
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id.
96. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: WHY WE WANT WHAT WE
DON’T NEED 3 (2001).
97. See JOHN DEGRAAF, DAVID WANN, & THOMAS H. NAYLOR, AFFLUENZA 27
(2001) (quoting various people who describe a SUV as “a status symbol” that
“makes me feel powerful”).
98. Editorial, Driving Past the Point of Safety?, PLAIN DEALER, June 4, 2006, at H2.
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prevents isolation and, potentially, meaninglessness in
continuing life.99
Anyone who has ever offered a material reward in
exchange for good behavior knows that the power of property
can control the behavior of others, such as family members. This
control often occurs while the would‐be benefactor is alive and
can take an infinite variety of forms. For example, a parent, who
agrees to support an adult child while the child is enrolled in
college, is in effect using family wealth to influence the behavior
of the adult child. It already has been noted that the incentive to
provide care to the benefactor is one justification for freedom of
testation, even though it also has been noted that social services
“are forthcoming, in poor families as in rich, more or less
irrespective of the suppliers’ inheritance prospects. Just as an
assortment of motives drives persons to produce wealth, so does
a complex of motives and emotions stimulate persons to care for
each other.”100
Testamentary freedom includes the concept that property
owners are free to attempt to influence beneficiaries’ behavior
from beyond the grave, by conditioning the receipt of bequests
or trust pay‐outs on specified behavior.101 While such “dead
hand” control often is criticized, we have seen that courts
frequently allow it, treating it as generally within a property
owner’s rights as long as the restriction has a positive purpose
and does not cause irremediable harm to living persons.102
Property owners may also exercise testamentary freedom in
reaction to the past behavior of family members. A relative who
cared for and visited the testator may be rewarded by a bequest;
a relative who was less attentive or acted in a way displeasing to
the testator may receive less, or nothing at all. Finally, the
testator may attempt to distribute a greater portion of the estate
to persons she perceives to be needier, while persons whom the
99. Alison Barnes, The Liberty and Property of Elders: Guardianship and Will
Contests as the Same Claim, 11 ELDER L.J. 1, 2 (2003).
100. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 93, at 11.
101. See Mann, supra note 29, at 1037.
102. Id.
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testator believes have plenty may receive less. The presumptive
heirs’ perception of what is “enough” may vary considerably
from the testator’s perception, as any survey of will contest cases
demonstrates.
FREEDOM OF TESTATION AND PRESUMPTIVE HEIRS
The tradition of testamentary freedom in the United States
makes it difficult to understand why anyone would feel entitled
to inherit property or would feel secure in such an expectation.
After all, as just described, property belongs to its owners, who
are free to dispose of it as they please, either during life or at
death.103 In the United States, testators may freely disinherit
their children, even if the children are minors.104 How could
such a system support any expectations?
One source of presumptive heirs’ hopes of property
ownership may be the legal system itself. It has been suggested
that a testator’s supposedly limitless freedom of disposition is in
fact somewhat limited because the law favors predictable
distributions to natural objects of a donor’s bounty, namely close
family members.105 “Notwithstanding frequent declarations to
the contrary, many courts are as committed to ensuring that
testators devise their estates in accordance with prevailing
normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary
intent.”106 In other words, you can give your property away
however you like, but the further you are from a “normal”
disposition to your presumptive heirs, the more likely a court
will be to entertain a challenge to the gift.
Courts rarely declare wills invalid unless they are
contested, and relatives ordinarily do not contest wills that leave
103. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235,
235 (1996).
104. Louisiana is the sole exception to this rule. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493(A)(2006).
See also Judith G. McMullen, Father (or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument Against
Including Post‐Majority Educational Expenses in Court‐Ordered Child Support, 34 IND. L.
REV. 344, 354 (2001).
105. Mann, supra note 29, at 1048‐49.
106. Leslie, supra note 103, at 236.
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shares to presumptive heirs and treat equally persons who are of
an equal degree of relationship.107 Disinheriting presumptive
heirs, however, may well precipitate a will contest. Courts view
“unnatural” dispositions with suspicion but give a tacit
presumption of validity to “natural” distributions; thereby,
courts are effectively imposing “upon testators a duty to provide
for those to whom the court views as having a superior moral
claim to the testator’s assets, usually a financially dependent
spouse or persons related by blood to the testator.”108 This bias
in the law probably discourages will contests when heirs receive
reasonable shares of an estate, but it leaves the door open to will
contests when disappointed heirs receive a lesser share or
nothing.
Case law and other sources suggest that aside from
expectations encouraged by this alleged bias in favor of
presumptive heirs, there are other factors that influence the
attitudes that family members have towards the property held
by older generations. Family members who are potential objects
of an owner’s bounty may have complicated attitudes towards
the property. Property received from an ancestor may signify
independence or status in itself. The current generation of
would‐be beneficiaries may also regard an inheritance as an
opportunity to be as well off as their parents. Due to various
economic factors, such as the demise of individual pensions and
higher medical costs, baby‐boomers and their children may be
counting on an inheritance to make ends meet as they age. They
may be disappointed, because their aging parents are living
longer and also have increased expenses for health care and
daily maintenance.109
In acknowledging the diverse feelings that members of
different generations may have about property, one author
commented that “money, she says, is never about money. It’s

107. See generally ANDERSON & BLOOM, supra note 24, at 118‐19.
108. Id.
109. Id.; Bob Morris, Stop Spending My Inheritance, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 9,
at 1.
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about other things . . . [u]sually anger and guilt.”110 An
inheritance also may represent the approval or love of the
benefactor‐relative. In a compelling essay about a mother‐
daughter relationship, writer Daphne Merkin makes the
following observation:
No wonder when it comes to love, we keep counting
the ways, tallying up the total. When I bring up the
issue of inheritance with my mother, then, I am asking
her not to abandon me to wanton circumstance, to
mother me from the grave. It is a fantasy of absolute
safekeeping I am requesting, one that will cradle me
from life’s indignities.111
The case law supports these characterizations of the
symbolic aspects of an inheritance. In Nelson v. Daniels,112 a
disinherited son contested his mother’s will alleging lack of
testamentary capacity and undue influence.113 The will was
executed sometime after the son and his mother had been
embroiled in a legal dispute over some of the mother’s property
over which the son had had a power of appointment.114 The son
allegedly transferred the property to himself.115 Despite the
admitted conflict, the son apparently expected to inherit from
his mother’s estate, and he contested the will even though he
had no material facts to support his claims.116 When asked if he
knew of any other individual who could testify to his mother’s
lack of capacity, he responded: “Well, put it this way. You’re
not going to make me believe that my mother hated me the day
she died.”117 Thus, to the son, a portion of his mother’s estate
symbolized her love, and presumably her forgiveness for their

110. Bob Morris, supra note 109, § 9, at 3 (citing ROBERTA SATOW, DOING THE
RIGHT THING: TAKING CARE OF YOUR ELDERLY PARENTS EVEN IF THEY DIDN’T TAKE
CARE OF YOU (2005)).
111. Daphne Merkin, Mother of All Surrogates, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 6, at
74.
112. No. 94CA29, 1995 WL 535200 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1995).
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. at *3.
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past conflicts.
Similarly, In re Estate of Glogovsek, discussed earlier,
involved a conflict between two stepchildren and their father’s
sister and nieces.118 In deposition testimony, the testator’s sister
said the following:
[S]he had always maintained a close relationship with
Frank, as had her daughters, and that she thought
Frank would leave her something in his will. The
reason for the will contest, in her opinion, was that she
and her daughters had been close to Frank and felt that
Frank should have “thought of” them in his will.119
The disappointed heirs in this case appeared to be looking
for affirmation of their importance to the testator as much as
they were looking for money.
This symbolic quality of gifted and inherited property is
one factor that compels family members to battle on until the
property itself is used up in the process. Other factors include
differing notions of financial need, ideas about fairness, sibling
rivalry, and unrealistic expectations about how large the estate
will be.120 As a practical matter, these disputes must be avoided
even if the claims are losing claims because the legal battle can
consume a large percentage of the disputed property.121 Even if
the dispute is settled, intended recipients will sacrifice part of
their shares both for the settlement and for the court costs and
attorneys fees. So how do you keep them from fighting after
you are gone?
AVOIDING POST‐MORTEM PROPERTY DISPUTES
Wills are designed to enable the testator to direct property
distribution after her death, and the testator naturally expects
those directions to be followed. As we have seen, however,
merely having a will is not enough to prevent family fights over

118.
119.
120.
121.

In re Estate of Glogovsek, 618 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 1235‐36.
See generally ANDERSON & BLOOM, supra note 24, at 118‐21.
Id.
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the property. The testor’s will must be drafted and executed in a
way that is most likely to result in compliance with the testator’s
last wishes. Testators need to take necessary technical steps to
ensure that their wills will be admitted to probate. Testators
also need to consider emotional issues and other family issues,
in order to ensure that the family peaceable complies with the
will after the testator’s death.
TECHNICAL STEPS
Estate planning manuals contain many suggestions for
assuring that the client’s wishes are carried out after the death of
the client. Many of these focus on using the most appropriate
estate planning vehicle for a particular purpose.122 For example,
a client who is ready to give property away during her life may
benefit from transferring title to joint tenancy with the intended
beneficiary or from setting up an inter vivos trust.123 In either
case, the fact that the property is transferred before the client’s
death makes the client’s intent very clear, and makes later
challenges more difficult and therefore less likely.124 Clients who
wish to retain ownership and control until the moment of death
are encouraged to use wills, with or without testamentary trusts,
which spell out every conceivable contingency with extreme
detail.125 Clients who are concerned about will contests may be
advised to use ad terrorem clauses, which cancel the testamentary
gift of any beneficiary who challenges the will.126
However, these different estate planning tools do not
address the emotions that arise in the context of estate planning.
Remember that the disappointed heir is facing a disposition that
is likely to be unwanted from a psychological as well as a
monetary point of view. With this in mind, the client and her

122. Id. at 118‐22.
123. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET. AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 299,
344‐45 (7th ed. 2005).
124. See generally ANDERSON & BLOOM, supra note 24, at 121.
125. Id. at 120‐121.
126. See generally DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 123, at 167.
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lawyer must write the estate plan in a way that clearly
demonstrates that the testator did in fact leave these directions,
that she meant them, and that it is only fair that the directions
operate as intended.
Once the testator settles upon a particular distribution, a
great deal of future conflict can be avoided if she includes clear
directions and statements of intent in the will. The lawyer
should explore every imaginable fact pattern with the client in
order to discern what the client intends. Then, careful attention
should be given to observing formalities and creating a record
showing that everything was in order.
Proving that the will was properly executed should be as
simple as having an attestation clause within the document
itself, in which the witnesses attest not only to the will but also
to compliance with statutory formalities.127 In some states, an
affidavit signed by the testator and witnesses, which affirms that
the will was executed according to statutory formalities, is
conclusive evidence that the will was executed in compliance
with the applicable statute.128
Establishing that a person is of sound mind and memory
also is fairly simple: it need only be shown that the testator knew
the nature and extent of her property, recognized the natural
objects of her bounty, understood the relationship between the
two, and was not suffering from insane delusions that affected
her distributions under the will.129 These requirements are
interpreted rather generously and can be documented with
simple statements in the will by the testator (such as, “I am
aware that I have two nieces who are the children of my late
sister”) or attorney file memos (such as, “On December 13, Mr.
Smith was lucid, and talked at length about his real estate
holdings and who he would like to receive them”). In cases
127. See generally WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4‐6 to 4‐12.
128. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 853.04 (setting out appropriate form for affidavit). See
also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2‐504 (Revised 1990); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6‐4
(amended 1980).
129. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 292‐293 (3d ed. 2004).
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where the testator is known to have some illness that might
affect thought processes, a videotape documenting her lucidity
might be to supplement the will. Because videotaped wills are
not recognized in lieu of written wills, any tape must only
supplement the estate planning documents.130
Where a testator omits a potential beneficiary, or gives
unequal gifts to persons with the same degree of relationship,
the usual approach in establishing the testator’s intent is a
simple statement of acknowledgement in the will.131 For
example, the testator may eliminate any concerns about drafting
mistakes or erroneous omission by stating “I am aware that I
have another daughter, Marjorie, who is not inheriting property
under my will.” Statutory remedies for omitted descendants are
limited to inadvertent or mistaken omissions, and a statement
that the testator is cognizant of the omission ordinarily
eliminates these remedies.132 Giving a reason for a reduced gift
or disinheritance in the will itself usually is discouraged. This is
because the accuracy of the statement may be challenged after
the testator’s death, and deliberately negative statements about
any person expose the estate to claims of testamentary libel.133
Testamentary libel deserves special mention because some
testators use explicit testamentary statements to vent their wrath
at presumptive heirs.
The statements may provoke
disappointed heirs to challenge the will on principle. The
literature provides many examples of such antics. For example,
one testator included the following language in his will:
Unto my two daughters, Frances Marie and Denise
Victoria, by reason of their unfilial attitude toward a
doting father, . . . I leave the sum of $1.00 to each and a
father’s curse. May their lives be fraught with misery,
unhappiness, and poignant sorrow. May their deaths
be soon and of a lingering malignant and torturous
nature. May their souls rest in hell and suffer the
130. See generally WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 26, at 4‐9.
131. See generally ANDERSON & BLOOM, supra note 24, at 121.
132. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 123, at 474‐81.
133. See generally Paul T. Whitcombe, Defamation by Will: Theories and Liabilities,
27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 749 (1994).
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torments of the condemned for eternity.134
Another example can be found in the will of Mr. Garvey B.
White, which included the following bequest:
Before anything else is done fifty cents be paid to my
son‐in‐law to buy for himself a good stout rope with
which to hang himself, and thus rid mankind of one of
the most infamous scoundrels that ever roamed this
broad land or dwelt outside of a penitentiary.135
In these cases, the disappointed heirs had powerful emotional as
well as monetary motivations for challenging either the will or
the offending language. Obviously, inflammatory language in
wills should be avoided by testators who want to preserve peace
in the family.
NON‐TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
When the share of a disappointed heir has been reduced or
eliminated, he likely is responding not only to the loss of
property but also to the perceived rejection and injustice that
this implies.136 Therefore, any client who is considering a
testamentary distribution that reduces or eliminates shares of
presumptive heirs must consider the emotional realities of such
a plan.
Obviously, a testator should have sound reasons for
treating natural heirs unequally or disinheriting any or all of
them. Sometimes the reasons are very sound, and the testator
should proceed with the cautions described in the previous
section.137 Because unequal dispositions invite will contests, the
testator should be honest with herself about whether the
message she intends to send with her testamentary plan will be
received the way she imagines. As described above, a testator

134. Id. at 752 (citing Our Daily Bread, February 1994, at entry for February 18,
1994).
135. Id. at 751 (citing John Marshal Fest, Some Jolly Testators, 8 TEMP. L.Q. 297,
311 (1934)).
136. See supra note 115‐28 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 128‐42 and accompanying text.
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might want only to reward good family behavior or equalize the
financial positions of her beneficiaries.138 Those beneficiaries,
though, might think the will shows that the testator did not love
or value them.139
The testator should be sure that an unexpected distribution
really is what she wants. She should think long and hard about
the bitterness and fighting that might result after her death
when it is no longer possible for her to explain or defend her
position. Nor will it be possible at that late date to soften the
position or soothe hurt feelings and feelings of rejection.
Moreover, the testator (who has presumably gone to a better
place) will not be around to deal with the bitterness and
contentiousness that result from an unexpected will distribution.
One criticism that has been leveled against testamentary
freedom is the fact that it is exercised by people who are exempt
from the consequences. “[A] testator may also lack inhibitions at
death that tempered her course of conduct during life. As one
astute observer has remarked, ‘Making a will is an exercise of
power without responsibility.’”140
It has been argued that parents cannot reliably control the
behavior of their children once the children have attained a
certain pre‐adolescent age.141 Attempts from beyond the grave
at ancestral control of one’s relatives are even less likely to be
successful, but they are more likely to yield bitterness,
resentment, and will contests.142 The Shapira case, described
above, provides a cautionary tale.143 There, the father may have
intended for his son to end up happily married to a woman from
within his own tradition. The actual results were otherwise.
The son challenged the terms of the father’s gift, and lost.144
138. See supra note 105‐09 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 115‐27 and accompanying text.
140. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 93, at 13 (quoting M. Meston, The Power of the
Will, 1982 JURID. REV. 172, 173).
141. Judith G. McMullen, “You Can’t Make Me!”: How Expectations of Parental
Control over Adolescents Influence the Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 603 (2004).
142. See generally Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Misc. 1974).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Twenty years later, the authors of a leading trusts and estates
casebook contacted the son’s attorney to obtain the son’s
comments on the case, but Mr. Shapira refused to discuss the
case. 145 The author stated, “It was a bitter experience, he said,
which he wanted to forget.”146 Few testators would knowingly
choose that legacy for themselves.
Testators
should
exercise
particular
caution
in
circumstances where they are tempted to condition gifts under
wills or testamentary trusts on the behavior or accomplishments
of the prospective beneficiaries. There has been a recent trend
among some testators, like the elder Mr. Shapira, to create
incentive trusts that require heirs to reach milestones or take
certain actions, like marrying or graduating from college, to
receive money.147 Sometimes, heirs receive payments
commensurate with what they earn themselves.148
As
mentioned above, where trusts are created during the grantor’s
lifetime, it is more difficult to challenge them later.149 Where
trusts are created by a will, they inherently are subject to the
same challenges as to a will described above. In other words,
where a will creates a trust, the trust fails if the will is not
admitted to probate. A prospective heir who expected an
outright gift or a steady flow of trust income may not be happy
with a conditional “incentive” gift and may try to contest the
will. “[C]hildren can be resentful if they feel that their parents
did not trust them.”150 Critics of incentive trusts point out that
parents may be too controlling and may unintentionally treat
their children or grandchildren unfairly.151 “The problem is that
there are too many what‐ifs. What if one sibling can do
something and the other can’t? What if one becomes disabled,
145. DUKEMINIER, supra note 123, at 31.
146. Id.
147. Catherine M. Allchin, In Some Trusts, the Heirs Must Work for the Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 3, at 6.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
150. Id. (quoting George S. Holzapfel, an estate planning lawyer at Lasher,
Holzpfel, Sperry & Ebberson in Seattle).
151. Id.
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depressed, or has an accident?”152 Where a prospective heir is
young or inexperienced with money, it may make more sense to
use a conventional support trust with a great deal of flexibility
for the trustee’s distribution decisions.
When a disappointed heir’s share has been reduced or
eliminated, she may be unpleasantly surprised and view the
unexpected disposition as unfair. Therefore, it is important for
the testator to encourage reasonable expectations among
presumptive heirs. Ideally, the testator should communicate her
intentions, and the reasoning behind those intentions, to any
heirs close enough to have a reasonable expectation of
inheritance. In most families, this surely would include spouses
and children; it might also include grandchildren, nieces and
nephews, and siblings. Warren Buffett, who has long derided
dynastic wealth, provides an example of this.153 He has
announced the transfer of property valued at thirty‐one billion
dollars to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which will
utilize it for charitable pursuits.154 Buffett also set up charitable
foundations for each of his three children to administer, and has
announced gifts of one billion dollars to each of these
foundations.155
Although Buffet certainly provided many
benefits to his children over the years, he consistently made it
clear to them that they will not inherit the bulk of his wealth.156
“He signaled early and often to his children what his intentions
were. They built their lives accordingly.”157
Understandably, many clients of lesser means than Mr.
Buffett resist having financial discussions, especially with their
descendants, believing firmly that their assets are nobody’s

152. Id. (quoting Ralph M. Engel, an estate planning lawyer in the New York
City office of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal).
153. Jeff Bailey, Buffett Children Emerge as a Force in Charity, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2006, § 1, at 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting Sherry S. Barrat, president of personal financial services at the
Northern Trust Company, a large bank in Chicago).
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business but their own.158 Others feel uncomfortable discussing
the issue or want to avoid family fights or hard feelings.159
Children may be reluctant to inquire into the matter for fear of
seeming greedy.160 Having the discussion anyway may temper
expectations and result in fewer shocks, hurt feelings, and will
contests in the end. This is not a magical remedy for family
feuds; however, it is just one more precaution that can be
undertaken. As a review of will contest cases reveals, some
disappointed heirs challenge wills even though the testator may
have signaled or informed the disappointed heirs that they
would receive no inheritance. For example, in Nelson, one
suspects that the mother told her son not to expect an
inheritance during the course of the mother‐son litigation over
the son’s improper appropriation of the mother’s property.161
Sometimes even a frank discussion will fall on deaf ears.
CONCLUSION
We are mortal creatures and, the pharaohs notwithstanding, we
cannot take our material wealth with us into the next world.
Under American law we have a significant, although not
infinite, amount of control over who will receive our remaining
property after we are gone. While many articles focus on the
way to accomplish a testator’s objectives, this article encourages
the reader to reflect on the emotional consequences of some of
those objectives. The emotional legacy left to family members
can be as important as the financial legacy. The testator who is
realistic about the likely effects of an unequal distribution of
wealth among family members, and honest with family
members about her intentions, has the best chance of leaving a
peaceful family behind. A peaceful family is a wonderful legacy
indeed.
158. See generally ANDERSON & BLOOM, supra note 24, at 69‐73.
159. Id.
160. Bob Morris, supra note 109, § 9, at 1.
161. See Nelson v. Daniels, No. 94CA29, 1995 WL 535200, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 5, 1995).

